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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All supplemental statements of fact are included in the 
argument below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF ALIMONY AWARDED 
Mr. Rudman argues in his brief that "the findings are adequate 
in light of the fact that there was sufficient evidence before the 
trial court to make a proper determination of alimony." Brief of 
Respondent, at 9. The Findings of Fact as found by the trial court 
are, however, void of such elementary findings as: 
1. The amount of Mr. Rudman's income; 
2. The amount of Mrs. Rudman's income; and 
3. The amount of Mrs. Rudman's reasonable needs. 
The evidence is uncont rover ted that Mrs. Rudman had reasonable 
monthly living expenses in the amount of $2,853.23. Defendant's 
Exhibit 102. 
The evidence presented by the parties relative to their 
respective monthly incomes is, however, controverted. For example, 
Mr. Rudman presented evidence and now argues that his average 
monthly net income after deductions for federal and state income 
taxes and FICA taxes was $2,184.89. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Mrs. 
Rudman presented evidence that Mr. Rudman had cash income before 
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taxes for the years 1982 through 1988 of at least $64,791 and as 
high as $141,876 per year. Defendant's Exhibit 118. 
Similarly, Mrs. Rudman presented evidence that established 
that she had not earned more than $6,000.00 per year from any of 
her business ventures. Defendant's Exhibit 101. Mr. Rudman 
attempts to establish through Plaintiff's Exhibit 113 that Mrs. 
Rudman had monthly income of $2,868.01. Such an attempt is grossly 
misplaced for the reason that Plaintiff's Exhibit 113 represents 
only the computation of the monthly average deposit amount to Mrs. 
Rudman's personal checking account. Such deposits do not represent 
earned income but rather the use by Mrs. Rudman of a portion of her 
$195,000.00 of pre-marital liquid income-producing assets. Vol. V, 
p. 6-8. Such use was required by Mrs. Rudman because Mr. Rudman 
refused to support her during the marriage. 
Relative to an award of alimony, this Court has stated: 
. . . the trial court must make findings on 
all material issues, and such findings must be 
sufficiently detailed and consist of enough 
subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court 
took to reach its conclusion on each factual 
issue presented. Failure to substantiate such 
findings constitutes reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are "clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only 
a finding in favor of the judgment." 
(Citations omitted). 
Sampinos v. Sampinos. 750 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The evidence relative to the income of the parties is controverted 
and capable of supporting different findings. Accordingly, this 
case must be remanded to the trial court for more specific findings 
2 
on the three elements the trial court must consider in setting an 
award of alimony. Only then can this Court properly review the 
award of alimony made by the trial court. 
Mr. Rudman also argues that the trial court's award of alimony 
for a period of approximately five years constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Mr. Rudman claims that the marriage lasted only six 
years. The parties were married on April 18, 1981, and the Decree 
of Divorce was entered on July 3, 1989, a period of over eight 
years. Given Mrs. Rudman's age, lack of education, training and 
skills, poor physical condition, and most importantly, the 
permanent alimony she gave up and the substantial base of her pre-
marital income-producing assets that had to be used during the 
marriage, it is only equitable that this Court award permanent 
alimony in the amount of $2,853.00 per month to terminate on the 
occurrence of any event provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) 
(1989). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
CHARACTERIZATION AND DETERMINATION OF 
THE VALUE OF CERTAIN MARITAL PROPERTY 
Mr. Rudman correctly states the principle of Utah law that an 
appellate court will reverse the trial court "only when the trial 
court's finding is against the pure weight of evidence." Jensen v. 
Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981). This case is precisely the 
situation where the pure weight of the evidence is contrary to the 
trial court's determination• 
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The first error of the trial court was the mischaracterization 
of certain loans from the Rudmans in the amount of $269,704 to 
certain of Mr. Rudman's business entities. As Mrs. Rudman's 
expert, Merrill Norman, testified, the loans receivable were not 
present prior to the marriage and could not be traced to any 
specific premarital asset. Vol. V, p. 192-3. 
Mr. Rudman did not present evidence specifically tracing the 
loans receivable or any part thereof to any premarital asset. He 
also withheld documents and information from Mr. Norman which would 
have allowed the tracing to be performed. The clear weight of the 
evidence can support no conclusion other than that the loans 
receivable constitute property jointly accumulated by the Rudmans 
during the marriage. As marital property, the loans receivable are 
subject to division. 
Similarly, the weight of the evidence can only support the 
finding that Mrs. Rudman paid approximately $26,898 for 
improvements to and the furnishing of two condominiums and the 
Scofield cabin. Defendant's Exhibit 117. Try as he may, Mr. 
Rudman cannot and did not rebut this evidence. The trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to consider this evidence in 
fashioning an equitable property settlement. 
Mr. Rudman's brief attempts to respond to the points raised in 
Mrs. Rudman's brief as to the value of other marital property which 
was improperly excluded by the trial court. Mrs. Rudman does not 
need to reiterate in this brief the errors, misplaced assumptions 
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and improper methodology used by Mr. Rudman's expert in the 
valuation of the cinemas. It must be reiterated, however, that the 
trial court improperly excluded or improperly valued property worth 
in excess of $472,589 from the marital estate. The facts and the 
law dictate that this property be included in the marital estate 
and be subject to division. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BT FAILING TO AWARD MRS. RUDMAN HER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
In his brief, Mr. Rudman argues that Mrs. Rudman failed to 
meet her burden for an award of attorney's fees. That burden is 
met by the moving party establishing financial need and 
demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of the award. Munns 
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Mr. Rudman argues that Mrs. Rudman was awarded assets 
sufficient in value to pay her attorney's fees. However, those 
assets, a home and automobile, are not liquid and cannot be 
liquidated without placing Mrs. Rudman in further financial peril. 
Mr. Rudman further argues that Mrs. Rudman squandered her cash 
during the marriage. Mrs. Rudman did not squander her cash, but 
rather, as stated by Mr. Rudman in his brief, used her cash to 
purchase a home, a business and a vehicle. Brief of Respondent, at 
28-29. Such are necessities that Mrs. Rudman had the good sense to 
purchase so that she would have shelter, transportation and the 
means to partially support herself. Had Mrs. Rudman not taken such 
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precautions, Mr. Rudman would be paying substantially more by way 
of alimony for these necessities required by Mrs. Rudman. Because 
Mrs. Rudman took prudent action, she should not be penalized by the 
trial court for failing to maintain a cash reserve sufficient to 
pay for her attorney's fees and costs. 
Mr. Rudman also argues that Mrs. Rudman's attorney's fees were 
exorbitant. Such an argument flies in the face of the fact that 
the trial court made no finding as to the reasonableness of the 
attorney's fees. 
Mr. Rudman further argues that the issue of contempt was never 
addressed at trial. Such an assertion is false. The pleadings and 
the transcript clearly reflect that additional attorney's fees and 
costs were incurred by Mrs. Rudman due to the fact that orders to 
show cause and motions to compel discovery had to be filed against 
Mr. Rudman. Vol. V, p. 214-221. Even though the trial court may 
not have specifically addressed the contempt of Mr. Rudman's 
actions, the trial court certainly had the equitable authority to 
award attorney's fees and costs that were incurred due to the fact 
that such actions had to be taken by Mrs. Rudman. 
The trial court's failure to award Mrs. Rudman her attorney 
and expert witness fees is inequitable. The trial court's failure 
to rule on the reasonableness of the fees constitutes reversible 
error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts of this case and the law, this Court 
should: 
1. Reverse the trial court's award of alimony and award 
permanent alimony in the amount of $2,853.00. 
2. Reverse the trial court's award of property and award 
Mrs. Rudman the additional amount of $236,295.00 to equalize the 
distribution of the marital estate. 
3. Reverse the trial court's failure to award attorney's and 
expert witness fees and award Mrs. Rudman the amount of $55,500.00 
for her fees. 
Respectfully submitted this JJs j~ day of September, 1990. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
^c/tUCa^t •^L&rt. 
Clark W. Sessions 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Attorneys for Evelyn W. Rudman 
210203J.PL2 7 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 2/sf day of September, 1990, I 
caused to be hand-delivered four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT EVELYN W. RUDMAN to: 
Paul H. Liapis 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
48 Post Office Place, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
AJJJVA/- / f/^A^^JH^j 
210203J.PL2 8 
